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The Moldovan Confederation Conundrum 
v I . Ciobanu and Marion T. Doss, Jr. Stephen R. Bowers, a ena , 
Executive Summary 
. ed several basic demands. The first category of 
The Gagauz leadership has advanc d I pear to be the most fundamental. The 
. concerns an t lese ap , . . . b 
demands relates to ~co~10mlc . d's that there is an economiC dlspanty etween 
situation that they mSlst be addlesse 1 bl' 
Gagauzia and the rest of the Moldovan Repu IC. 
. C urat Gagauz political demands are seconda~'y to 
If one looks beyond the rhetonc;f t '1' arties that would operate in local electIOns. 
the economic ones. They deman po ItiCap Pl' ent and believe that all laws should be t . the Moldovan ar Jam ' 
They want more sea s m II as in Russian and Romanian. 
published in the Gagauz language as we 
. . k' h involvement with Gagauzia, this has not served 
While much has been smd about Tur IS ! t tl eir cultural roots are in Turkey. Those 
f r ong the Gagauz ua 1 .' to generate any ee mg ~m .. the United States and, second, to RussJa. 
who emigrate are most likely to go, first, to 
. . niestria reached their closest during the e~rly part. of 
Ties between GagauzJa and Tlansd. I f ld '1 more effective relationship workmg 
. h t t' e GagauzJa las OUl , d f tI the 1990s. Smce t a 1m .' front'ltions of recent months are a pro uct 0 1e 
within the Moldovan RepublIc: The co~ f.' Tiraspol. They have led to a renewal of 
Moldovan political crisis, not mterventlOn lorn 
ties between these two regions. 
, d is to assume equal status with the Moldovan 
Transdniestria's fundamental. deman 'a ear to be limited prospects for a renewal of 
Republic within a confederatIOn, There pp 
violence such as that seen 111 1992. 
. of the three nations with the greatest interests in 
Direct foreign interventIOn by a~y one . -appears unlikely barring a renewal of 
. . R' tl e Ukrame, and Roma11la this sltuatlon- ussJa, 1 
violence. 
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Introduction 
The decade-long debate about the creation of a "common state" in Moldova has 
had great significance for both Gaguzia, the poor region in the southern part of the 
Moldovan Republic, and the so-called Dniester Moldovan Republic or Transdniestria in 
the eastern part of Moldova. Questions about the status of both entities have been 
couched in terms of politics, history, sociology, economics, linguistics, and even 
international relations. Of most immediate concern is the concept of collective rights and 
the impact that their recognition may have on prospects for resolving the ancient ethnic 
contlicts whose violent reappearance has marred the region's post-communist 
transformation. While the Transdniester contlict is not directly associated with this issue, 
the Gagauz situation represents a textbook example of how autonomy based on ethnicity 
can have a positive impact on ethnic contlict. Phrased in academic terms, the question is 
this: will the interests of the people of Moldova, Gagauzia, and Transdniestria be best 
served by a confederation or by a federal union? For the former USSR, with its mixture 
of ethnic confrontations, the answer to this dilemma is of special relevance. Given those 
circumstances, it is likely that the eventual answer will come within the context of 
political dictates rather than scholarly speculation. 
Gagauzia 
Locations of Gagauz Communities 
While we associate Gagauzia with Moldova, there are Gagauz communities in 
other nations. However, the largest (most populous) Gagauz community is in Moldova, 
where it has obtained a special grant of autonomy in a territory called Gagauz Yeri 
(Gagauzland) or Gagauzia. The Moldovan Gagauz live in five southern regions of the 
Republic: Comrat, Ceadir-Lunga, Basarabeasca, Tarac\ia and Vulcane~ti. Collectively, 
these regions where the Gagauz represent more than 50% of the popUlation were 
considered part of Gagauzia. In other districts, where the Moldovans or the Bulgarians 
are the majority, a referendum was conducted on March 5, 1995 to determine whether 
they would be included as a part of Gagauzia. Based on that referendum, 6 out of the 10 
districts involved agreed to join Gagauzia. As a result, Gagauzia now consists of a total 
of some 30 districts, 24 of which have a majority population of Gagauz. The Comrat 
region consists of twelve districts, Ceadir-Lunga of six, while Basarabeasca, Taraclia and 
Vulcane~ti consist of four districts each. Altogether, about 150,000 Gagauz live in 
Moldova, most of them in Gagauzia. 
An additional 31,967 Gagauz live in Ukraine, mostly in the former Romanian 
regions Ismail and Cetatea Alba. Within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
about 10,000 Gagauz live in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Siberia. They originally moved 
to Basarabia about 1909-1910 and were deported from Basarabia between 1941-1949 by 
the Soviets. 
Bulgaria boasts a Gagauz population of about 10,000 ethnic Gagauz, most of 
whom live in the Cadrilater and Varna the regions. As a matter of fact, many historians 
trace the roots of the Gagauz nation to this part of Bulgaria in the lih and 13th centuries. 
Between 1770-1830 they migrated to Basarabia. Another 5000 Gagauz live in western 
Bulgaria (Custendil, Pirotsk, Botevgrad), eastern Serbia (Nis), and in Macedonia (the 
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country). In Greece, there are Gagauz living in seven villages on the river Strimmon in 
northern Macedonia (the province). The Greek Gagauz are referred to as Urumi. 
In Romania, Gagauz noW live in Mangalia and in the surrounding communities of 
Vama Veche, Ion Corvin, Deleni, Petreni and Sipote. After the First World War, while 
traveling to Tu\cea, the historian C. Lascarov located seven Gagauz villages. Most were 
like Cataloi, where Romanians, Gagauz and Italians lived together in harmony. In 
Techirghiol, another scholar, M. Sanielievici, reported meeting a beautiful Gagauz 
woman. Even Nicolae Iorga, during his wanderings through the Romanian countryside, 
records having made a trip from Tulcea to Constanta in a carriage driven by a Gagauz. 
With the war in Crimea, a new wave of Tatars from Crimea came to Dobrogea. A 
witness from the village Caraibil (today Colina) told the researcher A\, P. Arbore
104 
that 
they were br~lUght from Crimea to the big Gagauz village Beidaud and then to Sarinasuf, 
Murighiol. lO) More recently, A. Oi~teanu and Luca Pitu met and wrote about the 
Gagauz. 106 These writers met Gagauz in the villages Doi Mai and Vama Veche. In the 
rest of Romania, the Gagauz are refugees from Basarabia. Many of them have not 
registered themselves as Gagauz during the censuS, taking into account that there are a lot 
of mixed marriages and that the Gagauz are orthodox as well. Moreover, some names are 
common to the Romanian language: Topal, Ciolac, Chi or, Uyun, Urum, Cheies, 
Arabagiu, Catargiu, Topciu, Dragan, Ciachir, and Coiciu. 
Historical Development of the Gagauz Dispute 
Small communities such as the Gagauz were vulnerable to pressure from the 
Russian empire and later from the Bolshevik successor state. The Soviet period was an 
especially difficult time for small nationalities to maintain their identities. Many small 
nations, overcome by the pressures of Russification, disappeared completely under Soviet 
control. Given the fact that assimilation was a norm of Russian imperialism, non-Russian 
communities were often doomed to disappear. 
During the Stalinist years the Gagauz su ffered greatly and in 1944 thousands of 
them were forced into labor camps. In the immediate post-World War Two years, a 
severe famine gripped the area and approximately one half of the Gagauz population died 
in 1946 and 1947. This humanitarian crisis was coupled with a post-war legal 
environment in which collective rights were not recognized. Because of a widespread 
belief that Nazi aggression had been facilitated by the concept of national self-
determination and the notion of collective minority rights, international law embraced a 
universal concept of human rights in which individuals rather than communities enjoyed 
protection. Thus, cases involving national minorities were not part of the new agenda of 
international law. The Gagauz were among the people who paid a price for the post-
World War Two legal changes as well as for the inability of communism to solve the 
much-discussed national question. A practical consequence of this environment was that 
in Gagauzia no Gagauz people held any positions of importance. Such key posts were 
always in the hands of Ukrainians or Russians. 107 
1()4 "Contributions to the Study of the Tatars and Turks" -Archive of Dobrogea, n, 1919, nr. 3-4, pag. 229 
\05 Stoica Lascu _ Foreign travelers about the Turks and TalClrsfrolll Dobrogea - celi. XVlII- XIX - The 
origin of the Tetlm's, Kriterion, Bucuresti, 1997, pag.213 
IOu Newspaper EchidiSf{/n!e - February 1993, la~i 
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political Organization 
The effort to assert collective rights em d' 
intellectuals began to study the history of th G erge lI1 the early 1980s when local 
in terms of their ethnicity. This intellectual fef tagauz people and to think of themselves 
d I 
. ' e or was a response to . f R .. . 
an t le Virtual destruction of the very id f G . c yea! s 0 usslflcatlOn ea 0 agauzla as an etl . . 
language. Secret meetings were oreranized b . d' 'd 1l11C commumty or a 
. b Y lI1 IVI uals who drea d f . 
the ~agauz Idea as a substitute for the conce t of the "s. ~e 0 restoration of 
meetmg
s 
leaked, the regional party comll1l'tt p. d OVI~t man. When wor. d of the 
. ee lespon ed With re . d 
orgamzed a series of arrests For most of th G . pressIOn an the KGB 
efforts was that they lost their'j'obs and any ~t' agahuz mtellectuals, the result of their 
L 
. ' POSI IOns t ey held in the t 
eOl1ld Bebrov was one of the best-known Ga . par y: 
ill-fated cultural and historical revival H gauz mte1lectuals mvolved in this 
, ,. e wrote a book about th KGB' 
measures and demanded that there be G .. e s repressive 
newspapers utilizing the Gacrauz language ~ ~gaulz fme.dla lI1c1uding television and R . b' . S a lesu to hiS demands h f' 
a usslan psychiatric hospital for three years E t 11 I' 'c, . e was con med in 
Chisinau where the security was less eff t' . I-vren ua y le was transferred to a clinic in 
• ' cc ec Ive. e escaped d ' 
RUSSia where he met with Andrei SakI' '1 . . an managed to travel back to 
b
l" f . ' 1clroV, t lUS gall1m er a m f . pu IClty or hiS cause. With the emergenc f' S· b eas~lI'e 0 lllternational 
to avoid further confinement. 108 e 0 a new oVlet leadership, Bebrov was able 
It was not until a decade after the first stirrin f . 
there was any prospect for realization f tl' ~~ o. a Gagauz cultural reVival that 
Gagauz idea. On 19 August 1990, short~y a~~~; ~~:~atlOns for. the. restorati~n of the 
Gagauz authorities (the same people who were the al 10v~ ?eclale.d ItS sovereignty, the 
proclaimed the sovereignty of the G'leraUZ S . t S J~ll~lltleS durmg the Soviet period) 
· I . 'b oVle OCIa 1St Republic 'th C 
capita city. The Gagauz leadership ackno I d d WI omrat as its 
with Moldova. On 28 October 1990 with tWI e ge no more than a federal arrangement 
A d 
' le support of the OMON t f I 
rmy un er the command of the Soviet crenel'al S t ,. . roops 0 t le Soviet 
tl
' " b S a a ll1 and Zaltev the G' I 
Jelr own supreme republican authorities" G' . ' ag,lUz e ected 
Up control points on the main roads into 'th .agau~la even created ItS own militia and set 
I I ,elr regIOn The Supre S . 
c ec ared that all the action.s of the separatists were i1le~al. me oVlet of Moldova 
After the Romal1lan language was rocla' d 
Republic of Moldova and the Latin alphab Pt 'l~l1e as the state language of the 
G 
. " e was ll1troduced on 31 A t 199 
a.gauzlans protested and formed their ow I't' I ugus 1, the t') . n po I Ica party the Gag H lkv G 
na IOn , whIch advocated autonomy for Ga auzia D' . a:lIZ a .. ( agauz 
member of the Academy of Sciences of ~ R' ~l~ to the activity of S. Curoglu, 
orientated towards Moscow and wa le lepu ~c of Moldova, this party was 
Y I 
' s, many peop e believe ma' I d 
acovlev, the former president of th S. .' I1lpU ate by Alexandre b d I ' e upJeme SovIet of the USSR Y k I 
oaste .t lat he had initiated and encouraged the se arati . . a ov ev often 
Transdmestria in order to maintain Russi'tn" 'd ".r I' st tendenCies of Gagauzia and 
Chisinau exercised no more authority in ~ 01 .er hll1 t.IIS .pa.rt of Europe. By early 1992, TI agauzla t an It did ll1 Tran d' t' 
· Ie Gagauz turned to Turkey for international olio . s mes n.a. . 
penod of the Gagauz crisis Gh Rat I' . P tical support. Dunng tillS early 
· c, . cog u, a promll1ent Gag J" . 
an ll1terview with the French journalist Jean-Baptiste Naude;~I~ po ItlClan, stressed this in 
107 . 
108 i~l~rvlew with Mikhail Kcndiglian, Comrat, 19 June 2000 
IO() ,,~~~lCW WIth Professor Maria Maruncvic, Comrat, 19 Ju~e 2000 
S, Ie reve ture des Gagaouzes," Le MOllde, 28 mars 1991. . 
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.. .. Turke because we have obtained no~hing 
We w~n~ ~o .ask fOl help,f~: auZ rel;ubliC was the result of the activity of 
from Moscow. If the 1I11tJative to create a gd b the conservatives from Moscow, then 
. t who were encouraue YR' the local commums s '" t tl1eir origins and to eliminate the USSIan 
G . determined to return o· , , Id today the agauz are IF' Ily the actual Gauauz authontles, 0 
influence over the Gagauz peop e, 1I11d 'd often Russ'l'ms ~ho kept their leading 
. d t St fan Topa an . , , 
communists, like the presl en e "t.' grouped around the newspaper Gagauz 
f moderate OppOSI Ion, functions, have to ace ~ t statute of autonomy within Moldova. 
Yeri, that is anticom~ulllst and suppor ~;:d;rshi of the Moldovan Republic, the Gagauz 
Eventually, With changes 111 the ~ the legal authority of the Moldovan bac~ed away from their. dem~~~ ~~d ~~~~~~ean Parliament passed a Law on the le,gal 
parlIament. On Decemb~l 2, 1 . '. G opulation. According to art. 2 of the Law, 
status of the localities With a r~laJonty .a~l~z ~ec\a:'e its independence as a state, should 
Gagauz Yeri (Gagauzland) enJoy~ t?e ngoliti~al statutes providing for Gagauz. auton~my, 
Moldova change fundamental eXlst1l1g P RbI' of Moldova GagauzIa obta1l1ed C t't tion of the epu IC " . Thus, under the 1994 , ons I u f ' 'ated with such events elsewhere 111 post-
autonomy without the viOlence so 0 ten aSSOCI 
communist East Europe, . ' 't t' authorities conducted a referendum in 
" 'of the new constl u Ion, , Id' , Under prOVISiOns 'd . to establish which localities wou J01l1 
, ulated by Gagauz 111 or el . C t 
those fi:,e ralons pop determined which city would the capital: omra or 
GagauZla. The referendum also G ITIITII'Ssion decided that the referel.1dum 
I "t Moldovan- auauz co Ceadir-Lunga. T 1e J0111 . 995 i; 34 localities, At first the Gagauz wanted to 
would take place on 5 Malch I t all of the five raions (11 % of the total land, area of 
organize the referendum throughou .' t more than 50% of population and 
4 I r' the Gauauz leplesen Moldova), In 2 oca Itles . '" d I ' I by economic concerns, six of the ten 
elsewhere more than 113. Motivate algelty f the referendum 30 communities joined 
d "Gagauzia As a resu 0 ' 'd 4 localities agree to J01l1 ,"e ion 6 from the Ceadir-Lunga regIOn an , 
Gagauzia: 12 fro~1 the Comtat I g Tar'aclia and Vulcfme~ti. In the vote to detenmne 
communities each from Basarabeasca, . C t 
G 'tl e maJ'ority voted for omra. . ' the capital of agauzIa, 1 G' 1'0 occupies the position of vlce-pnme-
hk ( vernor) of agauZla " h ' The Bas an go A d' to the documents estabhsh1l1g tell' 
minister of the Republic of. Moldova, dccort,l1:g, n the Parliament of the Republic of 
G . assured four epu les I f autonomy, the agauz ale ' . d ' 'ts I'n the Parliament as a matter 0 
, d' 'd I re guarantee se,l " Moldova. These 111, IVI ua s .a thers of course, may campaign during the electIOn 
collective and constitutiOnal nght. 0 , d (' 'n the P'lrli'llTIent of Moldova (they 
. 'f' 1 Gagauz epu les I " , " 
and at present, thele ale Ive suc 1 . D ratic Party and the Block of SOCIalist wer~ elected on the lists of the Agran~n emCocl isinau complain that, while it was the 
. ) M thnic Romalllans 111 1 . R " Unity-Edmstvo, any e ,t leaders of Gagauzla are pro- USSIan 
Republic of M?ldova that gra\~ted ;~~;::~~ l:~~ c~nsti~ute the national majority. All 
and tend to reject the Romal~Ian " I " use only the Russian language and, at the 
I t'f Romaman cntlcs c lalge, I t governmenta en lies, It' R Issian Young people, in genera, are no 
university in Comrat, al\ subjects are taug 1 1111 1, .' 
I R 1ian or Gagauz anguages. ' familiar with either t 1e omal " 'd read there is a pro-Romaman 
, '1' 'th RomanIa IS not WI esp , , WhIle an IC entity WI , this group are pragmatic Gagauz 
. G ',Most prom1l1ent among , . . 
community 111 agauzIa, , I d of Basanbia and place that allegIance 
I 1 Yal to the Romalll
an an ' , , "11 d'e intellectuals w 10 are 0 'TI f el that their national identity WI en U1 
'd 'f' f with RUSSIa 1ey e ' TI st above any I entl Ica Ion ,', t, ather than Russian interests, 1e mo 
best in an association with Romal1lan mteres s r 
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prominent of these intellectuals is Professor Dionis Tanasoglu, the Chair of Gagauz 
history, language and literature at the Pedagogic University "Ion Creanga" from 
Chisinau . 
In Tanasoglu's view, the Gagauz population will best develop within the Republic 
of Moldova and without territorial delimitation. According to Tanasoglu, only a broad 
grant of cultural autonomy is necessary for such a development to be effective, This, he 
maintains, is embodied in the 1994 laws and reflects a practical application of the concept 
of collective rights,110 
Factions within the Gagauz Leadership 
Political power in Gagauzia lies, for the most part, in the hands of the Gagauz 
People's Assembly and the mayors of the main cities, The current Bashkan is Dmitry 
Croitor, who was elected in September 1999, While the Bashkan appears dominant over 
the People's Assembly, Speaker of the Assembly Mikhail Kendiglian enjoys great power 
and speaks on behalf of those regarded as the hardliners, In this orientation, he is joined 
by the mayor of Comrat, Constantin Taushanjy, another of the region's hardliners. 
It is essential to recognize that there are important political differences within the 
Gagauz community, For example, the distance in miles between Ceadir-Lunga and 
Comrat is minimal but there are major differences in the approaches of these 
communities to the political situation in Gagauzia. The mayor of Ceadir-Lunga, Mikhail 
Formuzal, describes this as a contrast between the radicalism of Comrat and the 
pragmatism of his community. He points to a long-standing "revolutionary tradition" in 
Com rat, a town that participated in the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, This tradition has 
prompted Comrat's officials to start confrontations with Moldovan authorities and to 
inject a more emotional attitude into the debate with Chisinau, By contrast, according to 
Mayor Formuzal, Ceadir-Lunga's pragmatic approach encourages the development of 
cooperative approaches that will help alleviate the town's severe economic and social 
problems, Such an approach is natural for this community which has no revolutionary 
tradition and was completely unaffected by the Bolshevik Revolution, 
Mayor Formuzal, a pragmatist who is oriented toward the development of service 
institutions to meet the social needs of Ceadir-Lunga, is the principal opposition figure in 
Gagauzia, His administration has been characterized by the creation of homes for the 
elderly who would otherwise be without places to stay, the effort to secure medicines and 
other necessities for the city's poorly-equiped hospital, and a determination to follow a 
course of cooperation with Chisinau, Unlike Comrat, with its often-tense atmosphere, 
Ceadir-Lunga is a more open society in which outsiders, especially Westerners, are 
greeted with curiosity and, increasingly, warmth,lll Formuzal's outreach efforts have 
brought not only a more cordial relationship with the Chisinau political establishment 
but, more important for the city's living conditions, contacts with Western groups 
interested in helping this region survive the rigors of a political, economic, and social 
transformation that has had devastating consequences on many towns in the former 
USSR, Outside support for Formuzal's non-ideological reform program has, during the 
past year, come in the form of financial contributions from a Scandinavian 
philanthropists who bought a furnace for the buildings that Formuzal transformed into a 
::~ Inlerview with Professor Dionis TanusogJu, Chisinau, 6 October 2000, 
Mayor Formuzal has referred to Comrat as a dictatorship, Interview with the mayor in Ceadir-Lunga, 9 
October 2000, 
......... ----------
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retirement home and additional support from an American university, James Madison 
University in Virginia, whose students raised money for another furnace, heating fuel, 
and Christmas packages for many of Ceadir-Lunga's more destitute families. 
Fiodor Terzi, the mayor of Vulci'ine!?ti, is widely regarded as a centrist who 
attempts to advance some elements of practical reform without alienating the Comrat 
political establishment. Local observers of the Gagauz political environment feel that the 
Formuzal approach enjoys more support among the ranks of the city and town 
administrators throughout Gagauzia. 
The role of Vulci'ine~ti has become especially crucial in the political tug of war in 
Gagauzia. Together with Comrat and Ceadir-Lunga, it is one of the three centers which 
will detemline the political direction of the entire Gagauz region. While Vulcanei?ti is the 
smallest of the three cities, it benefits from the permanently hostile relationship between 
the leaderships of Comrat and Ceadir-Lunga. The latter cities are almost equa\1y balanced 
in tenns of numbers of registered voters. Thus, Vulcane~ti has become the pivotal distTict 
that can determine the outcome of the political contests in Gagauzia. Thus, Fiodor Terzi's 
the centrist position represents not only a political choice but also an effective political 
tactic. 
Over the past year the situation has become more complicated because of the 
determination of some of the Gagauz leaders, like Kendiglian, Croitor and Taushanjy, to 
secure more seats in the Moldovan Parliament. Their strategy is to gain more influence in 
Chisinau ratber than concentrate on the economical and social problems of the region. 
Many politicians in Cbisinau predict early elections for the Bashkan of Gaguzia because 
of the unresolved conflicts between Gagauz radicals and Gagauz pragmatists. Enduring 
tensions between the People's Assembly and the Bashkan's office are the root cause of 
the effort to call for early elections. One of the potential candidates for the Bashkan office 
is the pragmatic Mikhail Formuzal. In response to Formuzal's likely candidacy, 
Kendiglian and Croitor are working to undennine Formuzal's position as mayor of 
Ceadir -Lunga. 
The Current Political Situation 
Many observers have praised Moldova for how tactfully it has dealt with the 
Gagauz problem. While the Tiraspol-Chisinau relationship degenerated into full-scale 
hostilities, there was only limited violence as the Gagauz and Moldovan leaders advanced 
their respective cases. In the early stages of what we refer to as the Gagauz crisis, the 
Gagauz leadership threatened Moldova and declared their intention to achieve statehood 
even at the cost of violence. However, with the collapse of the government of former 
Prime Minister Mircea Druc, Moldovan authorities assumed a more moderate stance that 
encouraged a reciprocal response from even the most hard-line of the Gagauz leadership. 
When Chisinau sought and accepted assistance from Turkey, the situation improved even 
more. Turkey appealed to the ethnic impulses of the ethnic Gagauz and effectively 
estranged them from Moscow and limited Russian influence upon them. The visit of the 
Turkish President Suleiman Demirel, at the invitation of Moldovan President Mircea 
Snegur, ameliorated the actions of the Gagauz leaders. 
Today, Moldova controls Gagauzia's external relations as well as the region's 
defense. Gagauzia has dissolved its military organization and accepted the authority of 
the Moldovan Army. This authority extends to frontier protection, so Moldovan officials 
supervise Gagauzia's only frontier, that with Ukraine. The supreme authorities of 
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Gagauzia are formally subordinated to those of M ld 
assumes the position of vice-prime-minister of th RO ovba
l
·. The Bashkan of Gagauzia also 
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Political Goals of the Gagauz 
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share of the legitimate proceeds of the Gagauz wine harvest while offering little by way 
of compensation from the other state revenues. 
Gagauz Demands Debates over the relative distribution of resources quickly led to political 
demands by many Gagauz leaders. Those demands are expressed in calls for a greater 
degree of Gagauz autonomy or, a more radical option, a union with Transdniestria. The 
latter, one should note, is general stated as a likely response to a hypothetical disastrous 
situation that does not yet exist even in the eyes of the most radical. 
Thus, the most elementary demand is for creation of a federalized Moldova in 
which Comrat will share power with Chisinau. Tiraspol would represent the third element 
in the three-way split envisioned by the supporters of a federal state. Micheal Kendiglian 
expressed this demand upon his return from Moscow in late January, 2001 when he 
declared that he could not imagine Moldova "as anything other than federation between 
Chisinau, Comrat, and Tiraspol." 114 
As the Soviet Union collapsed, the concept of autonomy gained not only great 
popularity but also numerous quiet distinct meanings. The Gagauz concept of this term 
involves several specific demands. Among the most important is one that is cited by 
officials in both Comrat and Ceadir-Lunga, a removal of the disparities in the distribution 
of economic benefits. Officials in Comrat are especially adamant in their accusations that 
the Moldovan Parliament has not created equity in economic matters. The solution most 
frequently offered in this context is the creation of customs posts along the roads into 
Gagauzia. Such posts would be able to levy just benefits for the region while customs 
officials in Chisinau deny Gagauzia its rightful share. 
A second feature of the Gagauz concept of autonomy is the creation of political 
parties that would be unique to this region. Denied under the Moldovan constitution, 
these parties would participate only in local elections and would not be listed on the 
national ballot. Kendiglian and other Gagauz leaders note the actions of the Mircea Druc 
government in banning the Gagauz HaUry in discussing the need for their own political 
organizations. A third demand advanced by the Gagauz leadership, as noted above, is that 
Gagauzia be granted more seats in the Moldovan Parliament, perhaps even as many as 
one-fourth. This arrangement would help rectify the present situation in which there is 
only one high level Gagauz, a deputy minister, in the current Moldovan government. The 
call for more seats, presently, is non-negotiable and officials in Comrat say that they will 
not participate in the upcoming Parliamentary elections unless Chisinau yields to this 
demand. Closely related in terms of intensity, is a demand that Comrat be included in the 
negotiation process concerning the future of Moldova. Failure to include Gagauzia as a 
partner in this process represents, in the view of the confrontational element of the 
Gagauz leadership, a denial of the legitimate status of the region. Moreover, according to 
Kendiglian, he and his colleagues should play a greater part in the formation and 
implementation of Moldovan foreign policy. Moldova, he maintains, has no option other 
114 Bi/sa Press (Chisinau), February 1,2001. 
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such as Vasile Nedelciuc, Member of Parliament and ChairnL uf the Foreign Relations 
Commission, have encouraged ties with Turkey as a way of limiting Russian influence 
over Gagauzia.118 Turkey began to demonstrate a more general interest in Moldova well before the 
appearance of what might look like an opportunity for some moderate economic gains. It 
was among the first states to grant diplomatic recognition to Moldova and follow through 
with the establishment of full diplomatic activity in Moldova. Turkish President 
Suleyman Demire\, after visiting Comrat and Ceadir-Lunga described Gagauzia as a 
"bridge of friendship" between these two states. i In 1993, Turkey opened the "Gagauz-
Turkish School", a university just outside of Ciadir-Lunga. The university offers classes 
in Turkish, English, and Romanian. Turkey played an important role in the 1994 
agreements on Gagauz autonomy by indicating that it would like to provide 
developmental assistance and make investments in this region. More recently, a Turkish 
firm secured the contract to remodel the Chisinau airport and BTR, a Turkish bank 
already operating in Romania, opened an office in Chisinau where it quickly established a 
reputation as one of the nation's most important banks. 
While in the West much is made of the prospect of closer ties between Turkey 
and this small ethnic community, the fact of the matter seems to be that most Gagauzians 
have little fascination with Turkey. While no comprehensive data has been published, 
Gagauz officials speak frankly about emigration trends among their people and maintain 
that the nation that holds the greatest attraction is the United States. Religious converts 
such as Baptists and Jehovah's Witnesses almost always emigrate to the United States 
while Russian-speakers are inclined to move to Russia. Very few Gagauz emigrate to 
Turkey. The most common pattern is that Gagauz women will journey to Turkey in 
search of employment opportunities, marry Turkish men, and eventually claim Turkish 
citizenship by virtue of those marriages.119 While much is made of the Turkish associations of Gagauzia, its ties with 
Romania may well be almost as important, though primarily in a philosophical sense. 
There is a community of Gagauz intellectual democrats, largely based in Chisinau, who 
are pro-Romanian in their orientations. According to them, the political evolution of 
Moldova proper is inseparable from the political development of the Gagauz region. 
Should Moldova be headed by "real democrats," then Gagauzia is more likely to be 
governed by equally genuine democrats. In such a situation Gagauzia would likely come 
into closer contact with Romania just as the Gagauz did between 1918-1940. 
Professor St. Ciobanu has written about the loyalty of the Gagauz: 
From all the minorities from Basarabia, the Gagauz population is the closest to the 
Romanian nation through its spiritual qualities, loyalty and kindness of character. 
All the Gagauzians speak perfect Romanian and in the Com rat region many of 
them use both Romanian and Gagauz. 120 
118 Interview with Vasile Nedelciuc, Chisinau. 6 October 2000. 
119 Interview with Mayor Mikhail Pormuzal. Ccadir-Lunga. 18 June 2000 
120 St. Ciobanu. BasaraiJi(/, popiliatio/l, /Jistol)', ClI/tltre, Bucuresti. 1941. pg. 34. Romanian 
Academy, Studies and researches XIII. 
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Grigore Marakutsa, who frequently represents the DMR in its negotiations with 
authorities of the Moldovan Republic, is the leader of the moderate opposition, He is an 
advocate of less confrontational positions with regard to Chisinau while he is also 
associated with calls for the implementation of a more regularized rule of law in the 
DMR, He is a supporter of maintenance of the authority of the Supreme Soviet in 
opposition to Smirnov's calls for increased ex.ecutive authority, 
Vladimir Atamaniuk, the Speaker of the Supreme Soviet, has long been a 
supporter of Smirnov, However, when Smirnov began to work to reduce the authority of 
the Supreme Soviet, Atamaniuk opposed his former ally, Otherwise, in terms of his 
advocacy of a generally hard-line position on other issues, Atamaniuk is still associated 
One of the most important political organizations in the DMR is the Republic with Smirnov, 
Movement. This group is consistently pro-government and is regarded as an instrument 
of Smirnov's political apparatus, It does not function in the manner of a conventional 
political party but rather like the so-called "transmission belts" of the Stalinist period in 
the Soviet Union, In 1997, during a crisis period in which Smirno
v 
was calling for 
"greater vigilance," the Republic Movement played an important role in implementing 
this can, Industrial unions and associations are also important in the political life of the 
DMR, Their contemporary role corresponds to that of the trade unions of an earlier 
Soviet period, During the crisis in the spring of 1997, Smirnov held a series of public 
sessions with the leaders of the unions and associations as a way of consolidating 
support. Edinstvo, the political organization associated with Putin in Russia, has an office 
in Tiraspol but this outpost of Russian political influence has been critical of Smirnov's 
role in Transdniestria, In the December, 2000 elections, Eciinstvo won eight out of forty-
three seats in the Supreme Soviet of the DMR, Consequently, its role is not especially 
significant. 
political Goals of the DMR The fundamental political goal of the DMR is to enjoy equal status with the 
Moldovan Republic within a "common state," In May, 2000, the DMR rejected 
Moldova's offer, conveyed by President Petru Lucinschi himself, to give the DMR a 
specified, guaranteed number of seats in the Moldovan Parliament and to make the DMR 
president a vice-prime-minister of the Moldovan Republic, Because this offer did not 
incorporate the notion of the DMR as the equal of the Moldovan Republic, it was 
rejected, Sovereignty is the first political objective of the DMR, and securing the ability to 
demonstrate that sovereignty is a necessary accompaniment. For Tiraspol's authorities, a 
solution such as the one that was acceptable to the Gagauz will not work, A key 
justification for this stance is the fact that the DMR has an economic potential that 
ex.ceeds that of the largely agricultural Gagauzia, Thus, sovereignty (or independence, as 
their leaders often say) rather than autonomy is the goal of the DMR. 
The official view is further elaborated by Supreme Soviet Chairman Grigo
re 
Marakutsa, a moderate, as noted above, who has declared that the minimal requirement of 
the DMR is the creation of a confederation, with special emphasis on the ability to 
demonstrate sovereignty in the areas of economy, culture, and politics, 
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MGB head Shevtov, suspecting that Shevtov was transforming the MGB into an 
instrument for his personal power. 
Shevtov, who came to Tiraspol as a Major in the Soviet Ministry of Interior, has 
broadened the activities of the Dniester Republic's MGB. His activities indicate a 
primary concern with the domestic side of security. Accordingly, he has created a youth 
movement, known as "Young Guard", which has what is widely perceived as a "Nazi 
mentality" combined with an East-European version of New Age mysticism. Anti-
Semitism, xenophobia, and brutality have become the hallmark of Shevtov's youth 
groups. Although they publish a newspaper that cannot be found on the newsstands, their 
existence is not a secret and they can be seen on the street wearing distinctive clothing 
that marks them as members of the DMR's "skin head" movement. Their newspaper, 
entitled YOllth March, was prominent during the most recent election campaign when 
11,000 copies were printer and distributed at no cost throughout the region. Membership 
in the youth movement is confined to those aged 16 through 23. 
While members of these groups routinely break the law, their parent agency, the 
MGB, expresses little concern for this. In fact, their activities are consistent with those of 
the MGB's young leadership, individuals who openly espouse a modern-day Stalinism. 
The MGB's limited concern for the law is reflected in their apparent reluctance to 
actually take cases to court. In fact, it is said that the MGB does not like to appear in 
court and would rather deal with problems directly by using physical violence to 
intimidate opponents. The only notable case taken to court by the MGB is that of the 
I1ascu group, a case that has apparently taken most of the courts' time for almost a 
decade. 
The direct action approach of the MGB has been exhibited by its treatment of 
businessmen attempting to operate in Transdniestria. Commercial endeavors, especially if 
successful, often lead to arrest by MGB agents. Accepted police practice is that, after 
enduring confinement for a period of weeks, most business people are willing to pay their 
way out of jail and then out of the DMR itself. In the spring of 2000, the MGB targeted 
illegal money traders whose practice had been routinely tolerated. Over fifty of them 
were arrested and detained for two weeks. After that, they were allowed to buy their 
freedom. As a result of this MGB "fund-raising" initiative, one million dollars wa, 
collected and given to Smirnov.123 Today, the MGB controls most exchange outlets in the 
DMR and all profits are used to enrich senior officials. 
The activities of outside religious groups are an important security concern for the 
DMR as it is for Russia. The most active of those religious communities is the Jehovah's 
Witness group. Officials regard the Jehovah's Witnesses with suspicion and see its 
skepticism about loyalty to the state as evidence of subversive intent. Consequently, 
MGB officers now target them for harassment and arrest. All of the Jehovah's Witness 
property, money, Bibles, literature, etc, is confiscated and, where it has any monetary 
value, is turned over to the state. 
Just as the activities of non-indigenous religious groups are seen as a security 
threat, authorities are determined to suppress media outlets that are not controlled by the 
state. Asket TV, operating in the suburbs of Tiraspol, has long felt the impact of such 
repressive measures. Initially operating with a Western grant to encourage independent 
media, the station was shut down by DMR authorities. It was not until 2000, after over a 
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Issues of the Post-Communist Transitio . St 
n. ructure, Culture, and Justice 79 
year of closure, that the TV station was II d 
bJ ' . C a owe to rest . pu Icatlons from Moldova are also subiect t ff" .nne operatIOns. Printed 
bl ' . J 0 0 IClal suppres Wh'J pu IcatIOns may be offered for sale il T'. I.' slon. I e some Russian 
. ' 1 11 aspo there are I tJ f Romaman language periodicals. ' 10 ou ets or Moldovan or 
., While the MGB is one of the major forces in the D' . 
ltmlts. One of the most remarkable illustratiolls f th" MR, Its power IS not without 
I . d . h' ' C 0 IS IS the case ft· c lmge .Wlt subverSIve activities and detained b " 0 . ~n a torney Who was 
general meffectiveness of the court s thY poltce authontles. Because of the 
. ' ys em, e was never . d determ1l1ed to respond to what he saw I' h conVlcte . Yet, he was 
, . as po Ice arassment h d 
damages. Eventually, the courts ruled in his fav . so e sue the MGB for 
damages. 01 and he was awarded $3,000 in 
. The role of the Cossacks, Who have 'oined wit . . 
secunty concerns, reflects the leadership' . J h h th~ MGB 111 protectmg DMR 
There is a 15,000 member Cossack COllslIvle~t t .at the regime faces a military threat 
" , num y 111 the DMR Tl' -' dependents as welJ as actual troops and tl .' . . lIS number includes 
. . TI . ' ley me situated mto '11 . . Rivel. le Cossack orgal1lzation WJ1' I . VI ages nem the Dmester 
. . ' IC 1 IS part of the 0 . . 
RussI.a, enJoys both official support as well as state fund' rgal11z~tton of Cos~acks of 
secunty organs such as the DMR M' . t f S mg. It wOlks closely With other 
. 11llS ry 0 tate Secu'i t r I I presentatIOns, the Cossacks stress wh t· th d' I y. n oca meetings and 
. a ey escnbe as the . I dunng the 1992 war. Cossacks killed I' tl t f' I . crucla role that they played 
I n la Igltmg are bu" d . I . P ace of honor, the war memorial across tJ t. f Ile 111 w lat IS regarded as a 
Th '. . le sleet rom the DMR J' e me.monal IS dedicated to the dead f W 'Id W par lament buiJding. 
f1 ' . ,0 01 ar Two 'IS w ll' h con IctS 111 Afghanistan. ' e dS t ose of more recent 
. Cossacks officers describe themselves as a force to . . 
l11ternal threats. When pressed to identif whom plOte~t the regime against all 
strike against the DMR, they gener'lll: 't I they see as ltkely to launch military 
reminding listeners of the 1992 wa 'd CI e t le Moldovan Republic or Romania 
,r, an suggest that tl ' Romanian "nationalists.,,124 . 1ere are local supporters of the 
Economic Woes as a Security Concern 
Closely behind the threat posed by such "subvers' " . . 
the ~onsumer economy. Atamaniuk reco nizes h IV~ forces l~ ~he detenoration of 
heavily dependent on its ability to t' .fg h b t .at the jutl~re stabIlity of the DMR is 
I '. sa IS y t e aSlC economI" . W 10 l!1creasl!1g1y realize that thel'l' best . C leqlllrements of a people 
Ivl c economic prospe t I' . R oldovan Republic. c s Ie 1!1 lIssia or even in the 
The DMR leadership, of course does not 
economic circumstances of its population' R' tl C • .accep~ responsibility for the dire 
conspiracy directed by the "PI'O R '. a le: It cites. thiS condition as evidence of a 
. '. - oma111an elites" f th M ll1dlVlduals such at Atamaniuk thl's' . I . 0 e oldovan republic. For tl ' . IS simp y part of the . b' 
le DMR because the region has adhered to " . Cm~~p~lgn. eI~g waged against 
ranks of the MGB the reaime's . genUli1e SOCialist pnnclpals." From the 
• '" '. b economic Woes are de ·'b d '. . 
actIVIties. Jews accordmg to Ilardi' . SCll. e as a lesult of JeWish h" , ll1ers assocIated w'tJ I M 
ot elWlse .w~uld be held by "good Russians". I 1 t le GB, took jobs that 
It IS Important to acknowledae th·lt if . d 
perhaps superficial appearances, theb DMR', one JU ges th.e situation by outward or 
s economy has unproved in recent years. 
\1.\ lntcrvi 
ew with Andrey Sofranov, Tiraspol, 15 J line 2000 
.......... ----------
80 Moldovan Confederation CDnundrum 
Attractive restaurants and modern stores, things that were almost non-existent in the 
years after the war, have become much more Ctllnmon, Yet, the truth of the matter is that 
such establishments are not routinely frequented by the average consumer. 
For most people, economic life takes place on the street. According to 
independent journalist y, Voloui, an estimated 60% of all economic activity is based in 
this area while no less than 80% of all food purchases are make on the street.
125 
Street 
vendors, some with small assortments of used items displayed for sale on blankets spread 
on the sidewalk, others with tents offering new, perhaps Western products, account for 
most of the commercial activity that affects the standard of living of most residents, 
Prices, while still high when one considers the modest level of personal income for most 
people, are much lower than those in the formal stores that line Lenin Boulevard, That 
fact explains why the street vendors do such a brisk business while the stores are almost 
empty, Equally important is the fact that there are two categories of customers, Most 
common are those who work in factories, on farms, or in offices and institutes, Such 
individuals, with their meager incomes, struggle to satisiy basic requirements of life and 
are often paid in kind rather than in cash, Less numerous but more significant as members 
of the DMR's elite are those who have connections in the numerous illegal enterprises 
that seem to justify the existence of this Slavic enclave, 
While the consumer good sector languishes, the DMR has enjoyed some recent 
success in industrial production, While the Supreme Soviet set 20% as it targeted growth 
for 2000, data released at the end of the year show that the region's industrial production 
grew by 38%, Most of the growth was a result of successful years in metallurgy and light 
industry with the Rybnitsa Steel Mills performing best. Textile and show production were 
the only areas having a direct positive impact on the consumer goods picture, The 
restructuring plans of the Supreme Soviet are credited with bringing back into production 
five enterprises which had previously been dismissed as "hopelessly dead" just a few 
years ago, Apparently recognizing the desirability of improving the overall economic 
picture, the Supreme Soviet is now calling for introduction of far-reaching privatization 
plans for 2001,126 
Foreign Views of the Transdniesterian Conflict 
Of all the foreign states having an impact on and an interest in the potential 
instability of Moldova, none plays a more important role than Russia, Russian diplomats 
are careful to describe their interests in terms that are consistent with the requirements of 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), They express their 
'determination to continue to participate in the three party negotiations on the status of 
Moldova, As of early 200 I, the official Russian position was that the final solution of 
Moldova's problems was in the hands of the leaders of the Moldovan Republic and those 
of the DMR, There has been Russian interest in helping the DMR and Moldova deal with this 
problem, In accordance with a decision by President Putin, Russia has formed a special 
commission to examine this dispute, The commission is headed by former Prime Minister 
Yevgeni Primakov and is exploring the prospects for solutions to this persistent threat to 
1251nterview with y, Voloui, Bendery, 16 June 2000, 
126 IlljiJtag, February 1 200!. 
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the Ukrainian economic potential during a time when it faces the severe challenges of an 
economic transition. 
However, like the Russians, the Ukrainians see no reason to intervene in this 
situation unless there is an eruption of large scale fighting. Given that unlikely scenario, 
little change in Ukrainian policy is likely. 
Nonetheless, support for the negotiation process has been a consistent hallmark of 
both Russian and Ukrainian policy in Moldova. Their efforts in this regard, coupled with 
OSCE activities, led to a renewal of interest in the peace process at the end of 2000. In 
December, DMR Foreign Minister Valeri Litskai and Vasile Sturza, head of the 
Moldovan Commission on the Dniester problem, met with Ukrainian and Russian 
representatives in Budapest and announced that there would be a resumption of joint talks 
and, hopefully, a strengthened prospect for peaceful resolution of this conflict. 128 
Romania shares some of the concerns evidenced by the Ukrainians. The most 
compelling matter expressed by the Romanians relate to the withdrawal of the Russian 
weapons and military forces from Transdnicstria. One of Romania's most consistent 
demands with regard to this issue is that an observer mission be introduced into the 
region in order to evaluate the withdrawal of the Russian military forces and weapons as 
well as the destruction of weapons. 
Romanian officials also express a concern that Moldovan stability not be called 
into question lest that issue would slow down the process of withdrawal. Closely related 
to this issue is Romania's "ethnic interest" in a Moldovan population that is largely 
Romanian. But there is also a political interest because of the geopolitical situation of 
Moldova. Romanians describe Moldova as a bridge belween Eastern Europe and Western 
Europe because of the cultural, economic and political influence which the Moldovans 
have experienced for the last half century. 
The Moldovan parliamentary elections are a special concern since they raise the 
possibility that Moldova might bring about a rejection of Moldova's more open policies 
of the past decade. It is a Romanian fear that such a move might create a broader version 
of the Russian-Belarus alliance, something that would greatly change the nature of the 
common frontier of Romania and Moldova. 
While the Romanians express a concern about the status of fellow-Romanians in 
the DMR, there has been no official intervention more dramatic than the awarding of 
Parliamentarian status to DMR political prisoner lla~cu. Like the Russians and 
Ukrainians, Romania would be alarmed by renewed violence. However, unlike the 
Russians and Ukrainians, Romania lacks the necessary conditions to intervene in any 
military capacity. 
While there is a great deal of disagreement among various segments of the 
political community in the DMR, there is a consensus about the necessity for foreign 
intervention to bring about change. While some political actors fear intervention, others 
see it as their only hope for real change. Should any form of intervention take place, it 
would likely be taken by a member of this group of states -Russia, Ukraine, and 
Romania. However, as noted above, the circumstances that would prompt intervention 
are very narrow and, for the foreseeable future, unlikely to develop. 
128 Basa Press (Chisinllu), December 20,2000. 
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Ties between Transdniestria and Gagauzia: In Quest of a Confederation 
The most important connection between these two regions is that they were allies 
in time. Their movements were bound not by a common ideology but were both 
consequences of the upheavals of the first post-Soviet years. They were, for the most 
part, simply products of a period rather than partners in secession from the Moldovan 
Republic. 
The strongest ties between these two entities existed before the 1995 Gagauz 
elections. At that time, Stepan Topol, who had embraced much of Tiraspol's agenda, was 
replaced as Bashkan of Gagauzia and the close relationship between the two leadership 
groups ended. The current Bashkan, Dmitry Croitor, did much to reintegrate Gagauzia 
into the Moldovan Republic. For the remainder of the decade, the most prominent 
Gagauz politician to work for closer ties between Gagauzia and Transdniester has been 
Mikhail Kendiglian, the Speaker of the Gagauz Parliament. 
A rift emerged between the two groups as the Gagauz demonstrated a willingness 
to accept Chisinau's offers of a special status for Gagauzia. In the eyes of many DMR 
leaders, the Gagallz leadership was guilty of betrayal. There was, predictably, a 
corresponding hostility against the leadership of the Moldovan Republic because that 
group had been more conciliatory to Comrat than to Tiraspol. 
The Moldovan political crises of 2000 and early 2001 saw a renewal of the 
coordination of efforts between Comrat and Tiraspol. In July, 2000, Gagauzia opened an 
office in Tiraspol to officially represent Gagauz interests in that area. The rhetoric of the 
leaderships in both cities became increasingly strident over the summer. 
This process continued throughout the year and, in December, when the Gagauz 
Peoples' Assembly organized a Chisinau-based conference to voice their calls for 
federalization, they were joined by representatives of the DMR. Together, they issued a 
call for creation of a commission to develop a plan for power sharing between Chisinau 
and Comrat. 129 
While these two regions were initially allied by historical circumstances, their 
more recent association has been the result of political convenience. They share an 
interest in forcing Moldova to abandon the concept under which it was organized in the 
first post-Soviet years. The issue, therefore, will not be resolved on the basis of which 
best serves popular interests-a confederation or a federal union-but which will 
advance the political agendas of Comrat and Tiraspol. 
129 Basa Press (Chisinau), December 20, 2000. 
